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ORGANIZATIONAL LIABILITY 
James Fanto* 
This Article focuses on the role of organizational liability and 
the corporate monitor in addressing corruption in publicly traded 
business firms. The major disagreements with respect to 
organizational liability involve belief and theory. The belief issue 
concerns whether one thinks that groups, organizations, and larger 
social bodies or institutions significantly determine a scandal or 
corruption in a business firm. My sense is that many people believe 
that these social factors are unimportant background or, at best, 
secondary causes. If one accepts (as I do) that a scandal is 
determined by group, organizational, and institutional factors, as 
well as by individuals, there should be a theory that draws a 
relationship between these causes in a coherent way. Indeed, the 
need for a comprehensive theory linking these numerous factors is 
suggested by research findings that, in a given situation, there is 
often no single factor, whether individual, group, or organizational, 
that entirely explains the corruption in an organization because it is 
caused by multiple factors, with certain ones being more important 
than others in any given situation.1 Moreover, if one accepts that 
multiple causes determine organizational corruption, it is difficult 
then to make policy suggestions for remedying the problems 
without a coherent theory. 
Social psychology and organizational research offer theoretical 
frameworks that attempt to reconcile the different causal factors.2 
                                                          
* Professor, Brooklyn Law School. I would like to thank my colleague, 
Professor Miriam Baer, for inviting me to participate on the panel and my co-
panelists, Professors Henning and Orland. © All rights reserved. 
1 See generally YOAV VARDI & ELY WEITZ, MISBEHAVIOR IN 
ORGANIZATIONS: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND MANAGEMENT 23 (2004). 
2 One useful collection of articles with various theoretical frameworks is 
the July issue of 33 ACAD. MGMT. REV. (2008). 
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One particularly useful framework distinguishes between 
“organizations of corrupt individuals” and a “corrupt 
organization.”3 The former case involves “bottom up” corruption 
where rogue individuals in a corporation focus on their own 
personal benefit at the detriment of organizational goals. Their 
perspective and practices can also adversely affect an organization, 
or at least parts of it. For example, one thinks of a police 
department where there are rogue officers. Generally, individuals 
or “bad apples” are the cause of such corruption although group, 
organizational, and cultural issues may be implicated as well, as 
others imitate the individuals’ conduct in the organization.4 A 
corrupt organization, by contrast, is generally characterized by “top 
down” misconduct orchestrated by senior executives of a firm who 
act primarily for the firm’s own goals (e.g., to enhance 
profitability) and who establish models of thinking and conduct for 
others in the organization, but whose activities end up being 
harmful to third parties (e.g., shareholders, communities) and 
ultimately to the overall organization.5 Many examples of this kind 
of corrupt organization come to mind, for this is the typical 
scenario of a corporate or financial scandal: Enron with the single-
minded focus of its top management on maximizing shareholder 
value, even if the executives perverted the ways to achieve it;6 and 
a contemporary example is Goldman Sachs, with its culture of 
trading for the firm’s benefit at the expense of its service to 
clients.7 
A corrupt organization requires a different method of reform 
than does an organization of corrupt individuals. While reform in 
                                                          
3 See generally Jonathan Pinto et al., Corrupt Organizations or 
Organizations of Corrupt Individuals? Two Types of Organization-Level 
Corruption, 33 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 685 (2008). 
4 See id. at 688–89. 
5 See id. at 689–90. 
6 See generally BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS 
IN THE ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2003). 
7 See generally Complaint, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Goldman Sachs & 
Co., No. 10-CV-3229 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2010). The SEC and Goldman have 
just entered into a settlement. Consent of Defendant Goldman, Sachs & Co., 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No. 10-CV-3229 (BSJ) 
(S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2010). 
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the former case centers on removing the “bad apples” from the 
firm, the latter demands significant organizational reform beyond 
expelling the executives who pushed the firm down the road of 
corruption. Even if the senior executives in a public firm are 
removed, the perverse organizational mindset and practices may 
remain, for they have become ingrained in the culture of the firm. 
Depending upon the extent of the corruption, there must be an 
extensive “top-to-bottom” reform of the affected (one might say 
“infected”) firm’s ways of doing business. In the worst case, the 
organization must be disbanded because it is irretrievably corrupt 
and beyond reform. Drexel Burnham Lambert in the financial 
sector,8 and Arthur Andersen in the accounting industry are prime 
examples.9 Ending the existence of a corrupt organization, 
however, can be problematic, for it can result in the dispersion of 
individuals from the organization, which means that the corrupt 
mindset and practices propagate throughout the industry as the 
individuals take positions at other firms.10 Again, Goldman Sachs, 
which has “alums” throughout the financial world, including in 
financial regulation, is an example of a firm that spreads its 
questionable practices through its alumni.11 
Moreover, there are broad social and cultural factors that 
reinforce the individual, group, and organizational mindsets that 
lead to corruption within business firms. If these factors are not 
addressed, reforming the organization will not adequately remedy 
the undesirable conduct.12 For example, there are numerous social 
causes for the misconduct in Enron and in the financial 
                                                          
8 This was Michael Milken’s junk bond investment bank. For a contrasting 
view of the firm’s demise, see generally DANIEL FISCHEL, PAYBACK: THE 
CONSPIRACY TO DESTROY MICHAEL MILKEN AND HIS FINANCIAL REVOLUTION 
(1995). 
9 Arthur Andersen, one remembers, collapsed when it was indicted in 
connection with its auditing of Enron. 
10 See John M. Darley, Social Organization for the Production of Evil, 3 
PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 199, 208–11 (1992). 
11 For example, two Goldman Sachs alums include Robert Rubin, the 
former Treasury Secretary and Chairman of Citigroup, and Jon Corzine, the 
former New Jersey Governor. 
12 On these issues, see generally Vilmos F. Misangyi et al., Ending 
Corruption: The Interplay Among Institutional Logics, Resources, and 
Institutional Entrepreneurs, 33 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 750 (2008). 
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conglomerates that were at the heart of the financial crisis, 
including the academic and professional training received by their 
executives in business schools and in their professional careers. 
More simply put, their training was based upon a specific view of 
human beings (i.e., self-interested profit maximizers), and this 
view then became a self-fulfilling reality when individuals began 
to act in accordance with the theory and expected everyone else to 
do the same.13 Thus, remedying business corruption requires a 
transformation of the basis of business training, which goes beyond 
the reform of specific business organizations. Significantly, the 
issue of organizational corruption is complex and a simple 
solution, such as the expulsion or incarceration of a few 
individuals, does not accomplish meaningful reform of a corrupt 
firm. 
Organizational liability, whether criminal or “quasi criminal” 
in the form of an enforcement action brought by a government 
agency such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), 
is one way in which a corrupt business organization can be 
reformed. The major problem with organizational liability, whether 
in the criminal or civil enforcement context, is that it has not been 
used in a sustained, thoughtful way to reform corrupt 
organizations. Rather, it has served as a tool for making an 
organization a part of the prosecutorial process against corrupt 
(and even not so corrupt) individuals in the firm.14 The 
                                                          
13 See, e.g., Sumantra Ghoshal, Bad Management Theories Are Destroying 
Good Management Practices, 4 ACAD. MGMT. LEARNING & EDUC. 75, 76-77 
(2005); Dennis A. Gioia, Business Education’s Role in the Crisis of Corporate 
Confidence, 16 ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE 142, 143 (2002). 
14 See James A. Fanto, Recognizing the “Bad Barrel” in Public Business 
Firms: Social and Organizational Factors in Misconduct by Senior Decision-
Makers, 57 BUFFALO L. REV. 1, 54-61 (2009) [hereinafter Bad Barrel]. A well-
known example of the use of organizational prosecution to reach individuals is 
the prosecution of executives of the accounting firm KPMG in the Southern 
District of New York. In several thoughtful opinions, Judge Kaplan found that 
prosecutors coerced KPMG not to provide assistance and defense to the accused 
employees. For a description of this jurisprudence and related developments, see 
JAMES A. FANTO, DIRECTORS’ AND OFFICERS’ LIABILITY § 7.6 (2d ed. 2009). 
See also John Hasnas, The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of 
Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1329 (2009) (arguing that 
corporate liability is un-American in that it gives prosecutors too much 
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prosecutorial and enforcement situation concerning business 
organizations today is heavily weighted against the accused 
employees when they are alleged to be involved in a criminal 
violation or a serious civil infraction. Under pressure from 
prosecutors and enforcement personnel, an accused firm will 
identify individuals to be sacrificed as scapegoats for the benefit of 
the organization. The organization can then undertake reforms, 
even if they lack substance, and argue to the outside world that the 
problem has been addressed because the “bad apples” have been 
expelled. The use of organizational liability thus reflects the belief 
that corruption in a firm is due to the “bad apples,” and not to a 
perverse firm culture or business practices that in fact transcend 
individuals. 
It is not the place here to explore in detail the reasons for this 
use.15 Suffice it to say here that there are interrelated individual, 
group, organizational, and institutional reasons for this 
prosecutorial and enforcement emphasis on prosecuting 
individuals. For example, prosecutors have limited time horizons 
in office and for career reasons want the kind of visible results that 
come from putting away the “bad guys.” Organizations, like 
offices of U.S. attorneys and the SEC Enforcement Division, have 
institutional practices and are part of a legal system that focuses on 
individual liability. Moreover, prosecutors and enforcement staff 
are driven by the U.S. ideological tenet that outcomes are due 
primarily to individuals. 
That being said, the question arises whether organizational 
liability could be altered to affect real reform of a corrupt business 
firm. This question raises the issue of the role of the corporate 
monitor, which is a standard part of the deferred or the no 
prosecution agreement. In practice, the corporate monitor is often a 
former prosecutor or judge who is appointed for a limited term to 
                                                          
discretion in the prosecution of individuals in firms).  But see generally Sara Sun 
Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 1481 (2009) (arguing that these abuses do not characterize just corporate 
criminal liability, but criminal prosecution more generally. For example, 
prosecutors are given too much discretion, the crimes are overly broad and not 
always aimed at reprehensible conduct, and innocent third parties are often 
punished.). 
15 For an in-depth discussion on this topic, see Bad Barrel, supra note 14. 
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ensure that the business firm reforms itself in line with the 
commitments it made in the agreement. The monitor is, therefore, 
an outsider to the firm and even to the firm’s business and has a 
defined, restricted role, except in unusual cases.16 The firm’s 
commitments in an agreement are often of a highly legal or 
technical nature. The firm, for example, might commit to 
enhancing its compliance system, increasing compliance and ethics 
training for employees, incorporating more oversight into 
transaction approvals, and hiring outside auditors or other parties 
to help it develop compliance or other systems.17 The goal of the 
corporate monitor is to see that these commitments are fulfilled, 
which has a “check the box” aspect about his or her tasks.18 
This kind of a corporate monitor is likely to be useful, or at 
worse only to be a minor expense, in a situation where a scandal 
involved only corrupt individuals and a partial corruption of the 
organization. The “bad apples” will be removed, and the monitor’s 
supervision of the organization’s reforms will help the firm put 
itself back on the lawful path and, as discussed below, will send a 
signal to outsiders about its rehabilitation. Again, given the 
dynamics of organizational prosecution, this kind of monitor with a 
compliance orientation is applied in all cases of corruption because 
of the underlying assumption that they primarily involve corrupt 
individuals. 
However, this monitor will generally be of little value in a 
corrupt organization, where the organizational beliefs and ways of 
conduct (in short, its culture) have been altered and corrupted. 
                                                          
16 One unusual case was Richard Breeden’s appointment as a monitor of 
WorldCom by Judge Rakoff. Mr. Breeden was involved in a wholesale reform 
of the firm. See generally RICHARD C. BREEDEN, RESTORING TRUST, REPORT 
TO THE HON. JED S. RAKOFF, THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT OF THE 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE 
FUTURE OF MCI, INC. (2003). 
17 See U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, ATTY’S OFF., PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL 
PROSECUTION OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 9-28.1300 (2008). 
18 For the Department of Justice’s discussion of the selection and tasks of 
the monitor, see generally Memorandum from Craig S. Morford, Acting Deputy 
Att’y Gen., U.S. Atty’s Off., to Heads of Dep’t Components, U.S. Atty’s, 
Selection of Use of Monitors in Deferred Prosecution Agreements and Non-
Prosecution Agreements with Corporations (Mar. 7, 2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/dag/morford-useofmonitorsmemo-03072008.pdf. 
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Since, in other words, corruption has taken root in the 
organization, meaningful reform would require an in-depth 
transformation of the firm. To be effective in these circumstances a 
monitor should have a more open-ended mandate, significant 
resources (including advice from firm insiders), adequate 
incentives, and the competence to understand how to change 
ingrained organizational views and practices. As an alternative, a 
traditional compliance-oriented monitor could prove effective in a 
corrupt organization scenario, but only if he or she assisted new 
executives who were themselves motivated to alter significantly 
the organization. 
In an earlier article, I examined how federal prosecutors and 
the SEC could reorient their deferred or no prosecution agreements 
to use a corporate monitor in order to accomplish more significant 
organizational reform, in circumstances where such reform was 
needed.19 I concluded that the SEC was better situated than federal 
prosecutors for this task, since it has jurisdiction over public 
companies that are part of the market system that it regulates.20 
More simply, the SEC has an institutional interest in more 
significant organizational and industry-wide reform with respect to 
companies under its regulatory jurisdiction and is not as 
susceptible to pressures for prosecutorial results. Accordingly, it 
could design a mandate for a corporate monitor that would be more 
extensive than what has been typical, and federal prosecutors could 
give it their support. The monitor could continue to be a prominent 
lawyer, judge, or other professional, whose stature is useful when 
the monitor must deal with executives who might be inclined to 
continue past practices. 
On the issue of competence to accomplish meaningful reform, I 
argued that social psychologists and organizational theorists should 
be enlisted as consultants by corporate monitors in order to bring 
their knowledge of group, organizational, and institutional causes 
of misconduct to the reform of companies.21 Although they are not 
                                                          
19 See Bad Barrel, supra note 14, at 73–76. 
20 This jurisdiction comes from the fact that public companies are reporting 
companies under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, which means they 
are companies whose securities are traded in organized markets. See generally 
Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78l (West 2010). 
21 See Bad Barrel, supra note 14, at 76–79. 
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likely to be the right persons for the position of corporate monitor 
(i.e., not having the adequate “stature” to deal with senior 
executives), they would be ideal for the consultant role, similar to 
accountants, finance specialists, and outside lawyers who are 
brought in for their expertise. Moreover, enlisting social 
psychologists and organizational theorists would not only bring 
their expertise to reform efforts, but their participation would also 
reinforce the view that organizational corruption is not only due to 
individual factors; in other words, it would ensure that group, 
organization, and institutional factors are adequately recognized. In 
addition, their involvement would counter the current bias—held 
by academics and practitioners alike—concerning problems in 
business organizations, which tends to view them as just matters of 
financial reform and finance. 
It should also be recognized that a corporate monitor can help a 
firm in its rehabilitation, which is a social process, whether the 
corruption in the firm was widespread or limited. Organizational 
theorists who study firm rehabilitation point out that it passes 
through several stages: (i) discovery and identification of the facts 
of the scandal; (ii) offering an adequate explanation for it; (iii) 
undergoing punishment; and (iv) rehabilitation proper, which 
includes internal changes and an explanation of the reform to 
external parties.22 By the time a corporate monitor is installed, the 
firm has generally disclosed the facts and reasons for the scandal, 
offered a suitable explanation, and accepted its punishment. 
Clearly, a major role for the monitor in the rehabilitation of the 
organization is to affect the necessary internal changes to the firm 
and to make it clear to outsiders that the changes adequately 
address the corruption and that the firm is truly reformed. Without 
rehabilitation, a firm may continue to be punished “informally,” as 
customers, regulators, and the media deem the official punishment 
to be too light and the internal reforms to be inadequate. Thus, 
while the monitor is engaged in substantive reforms, he or she also 
has a symbolic or signaling function to internal and external 
constituencies.23 
                                                          
22 See Michael D. Pfarrer et al., After the Fall: Reintegrating the Corrupt 
Organization, 33 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 730, 735–40 (2008). 
23 The monitor thus becomes a symbol for those in the organization who 
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Finally, the responsibility of a government organization for a 
corporate problem suggests that the government organization can 
be reformed as well. For example, there may well be group, 
organizational, and cultural issues at the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System and the U.S. Treasury Department, which, 
during the financial crisis, led these agencies to engage in unethical 
and unprincipled transgressions: saving certain financial 
institutions, but not others; strong-arming Bank of America into 
purchasing Merrill Lynch; and supporting the payment of 
counterparties of American International Group.24 It would appear 
that, for reasons of sovereign immunity and other doctrines, 
organizational liability with its corporate monitor is not possible 
here, whether criminal or civil, and the question arises how reform 
of these agencies can be achieved, except through the political 
process and Congressional oversight. There are, however, 
Inspectors General and oversight boards, which provide outside 
perspectives and reform suggestions to the agencies, and they have 
sparked reforms within the SEC and watched over the actions of 
the Treasury.25 My suggestion for corporate monitors to enlist the 
                                                          
wish to reform it and who are undertaking the necessary cultural changes.  They 
can then act under the authority of the monitor and use his or her power. See 
generally Peter Henning, Corporate Criminal Liability and the Potential for 
Rehabilitation, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1417 (2009) (arguing that criminal 
prosecution through the use of deferred prosecution agreements actually works 
as a useful tool in reforming the organization by expressing a social message to 
it that spurs its reform and overcomes the firm’s reluctance to change its 
culture). 
24 In an opinion rejecting a settlement between the SEC and Bank of 
America, Judge Rakoff expressed his own concerns about the conduct of the 
SEC in its investigation of Bank of America’s disclosure violations regarding 
the Merrill Lynch merger. See generally Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Bank of 
America, Nos. 09-CV-6829 (JSR), 10-CV-0215 (JSR), 2010 WL 624581 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010). 
25 For example, the SEC Inspector General investigated the SEC’s 
inadequate regulation of investment bank holding companies and mishandling of 
inspections of Bernie Madoff. See OFFICE OF AUDITS, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF OCIE 
EXAMINATIONS OF BERNARD L. MADOFF INVESTMENT SECURITIES, LLC (2009). 
For the Treasury, there is a Congressional Oversight Panel reviewing its actions 
during the financial crisis, see CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, http://cop.senate.gov 
(last visited Oct. 13, 2010), and a Special Inspector General of the Troubled 
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help of social psychologists and organizational theorists could 
equally apply to these officials and reviewing boards. With this 
expert aid, Inspectors General and oversight boards could make 
reform proposals for these agencies that would be more effective in 
addressing their organizational and institutional defects. 
 
                                                          
Asset Relief Program, see OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE 
TROUBLE ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, http://www.sigtarp.gov (last visited Oct. 13, 
2010). 
